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Evaluating the Private Sector Perspective on the Financial 
Risks of Climate Change 
Richenda Connell1, Alan Miller2 and Vladimir Stenek3 
Grenada used to be considered a safe haven in a hurricane free zone within the 
Caribbean; no major hurricane had been experienced for more than 50 years. 
Consequently, boat owners were able to obtain lower insurance premiums by docking there 
in hurricane-prone months.  However, in September 2004 Grenada was struck by 220 
km/hour winds from Hurricane Ivan, resulting in damage to an estimated 90 percent of 
buildings and hundreds of boats and the loss of close to 40 lives.4  Total damages were on 
the order of twice the national GDP.5  This experience illustrates some of the challenges 
climate change presents for private companies – specifically difficulties predicting future 
climate based on past experience, with potentially devastating consequences. 
Adaptation is now recognized as an essential component of the 
response to anthropogenic climate change, with the acknowledgement that 
some significant adverse impacts are now unavoidable.6  While climate 
change impacts will intensify over time, some effects are already occurring7 
and early action to manage these may reduce total costs and risks.  In 
addition, some adaptation actions are of a “no regrets” character, meaning 
that they deliver benefits that exceed their costs, whatever the extent of 
climate change.  
1. Richenda Connell, CTO and Co-founder, Acclimatise, 26, Beaumont Street,
Oxford, OX1 2NP, UK. www.acclimatise.uk.com 
2. Alan Miller, Principal Climate Change Specialist, International Finance
Corporation, Washington, D.C. 
3. Vladimir Stenek, Climate Change Specialist, International Finance
Corporation, Washington, D.C. 
4. U.N. OFFICE FOR COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, Grenada Hurricane Ivan
Flash Appeal Oct 2004 - Mar 2005 (October 1, 2004).  
5. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT CARIBBEAN, Grenada Hurricane Ivan
Reconstruction Program, Quarterly Report (Mar. 31, 2005). 
6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2007 –
The Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 68 (S. Soloman et al. eds., Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
7. Id.
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Climate change vulnerability and adaptation measures are most often 
identified in several sectors and associated with several distinct climate 
changes: 
•  agriculture, due to higher temperatures, potential storm
damage, and changes in precipitation;
• water resources, due to changes in the hydrological cycle and
glacial melt in some regions,
• coastal land use and development, due to sea level rise and
increased storm surges; and
• health, due to changes in distributions of disease vectors with
warmer temperatures and changes in precipitation.8
In reality, this list should be much more extensive and detailed, since 
any large, fixed asset is potentially at risk. However, there is currently a lack 
of knowledge and research on climate change risks to many industry sectors. 
While climate change risks vary regionally and over time, experts generally 
agree that poorer countries and populations will suffer most from climate 
change due to their lower “adaptive capacity,” i.e., the resources, knowledge 
and institutions necessary to identify and implement adaptive measures.9  
Accordingly, climate change has been termed the world’s biggest regressive 
tax because the activities of those with higher incomes are disproportionally 
responsible for climate change while impact of climate change is 
experienced primarily by the poorest.10  A related but less discussed feature 
of adaptation activities is that much of the initiative and investment will 
have to come from the private sector.11  The precise nature of such actions, 
8. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in 2007 is widely regarded as the most recent international 
consensus review of climate change science and policy.  The report was produced 
in several volumes in addition to a “Summary for Policymakers;” all are available 
on-line at the website of the IPCC, www.ipcc.ch.  The analysis required to translate 
the physical consequences of climate change to localized economic and human 
impacts is evolving but inherently uncertain for reasons reviewed in this article. 
The IPCC summarizes the possible effects of climate change in terms of four 
sectors: agriculture, forestry, ecosystems; water resources; human health; and 
industry, settlement, and society.  See id., at table SPM.3 at 13. 
9. N. H. STERN. THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW vii 
(Cambridge University Press 2007). 
10. Views of Kirk Smith, University of California, Berkeley, as summarized in
Adapt or Die; Climate Change and the Poor, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm? story_id=12208005. 
11. U.N. FCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, 2007, at 170,
177. “When considering means to enhance investment and financial flows to address
climate change in the future, it is important to focus on the role of private-sector
investments as they constitute the largest share of investment and financial flows (86
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and thus the division between public and private responses, will vary by 
country and sector.  For example, the responsibility for basic infrastructure, 
including water systems and power plants, remains primarily a public 
function in most countries; health systems are a mixed public/private sector, 
while farming, buildings, and land use decisions tend to be primarily in 
private hands (although very much shaped by government policies).12  While 
the balance of responsibility varies, the significance of viewing adaptation 
issues from a private sector perspective is consistently apparent. 
This article describes an early approach to understanding climate 
change adaptation needs and opportunities in developing countries from a 
financial perspective.  This approach was based on a pilot program 
undertaken by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector 
arm of the World Bank Group,13 working in conjunction with risk 
management consultants Acclimatise and Synergy.  Part I of the article is a 
summary of some of the challenges associated with understanding 
adaptation issues.  Part II describes the analytical approach now being 
applied to several IFC investments in order to explore the ability to identify 
the risks of climate change at the level of specific investments, and where 
possible, to further identify and evaluate adaptive measures.  Finally, Part III 
discusses some initial findings and issues from IFC’s pilot program to date. 
The Adaptation Challenge from a Private Financial Perspective 
The challenges to an integrated assessment of the risks and 
opportunities arising from climate change lie in great part in a number of 
underlying uncertainties.  Further complicating the matter is that much of 
the climate change modeling produces forecasts for outcomes several 
decades hence.  For example, most of the regional climate projections 
analyzed by the IPCC are for the 2080-2099 time period.14  One consequence 
of these distant projections is the misperception of climate change as a set 
percent). . . . Private sources of funding can be expected to cover a portion of the 
adaptation costs in sectors (such as AFF and infrastructure) with privately owned 
physical assets, in developed countries, in particular. 
12. IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change at 976 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2007). 
13. The IFC is legally and financially linked with, but distinct from, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA), the two entities that together constitute what is 
referred to as the World Bank.  The World Bank distributes funds through sovereign 
loans.  Together with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), these 
entities constitute the World Bank Group. 
14. IPCC, supra note 6.
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of discrete physical events placed in a relatively distant future.  Current 
costs for reducing emissions must be weighed against the value of benefits 
in the remote future, making the assessment of climate change risks over 
long time periods central to the debate about the economics of responding 
to climate change.15  As a result, there has been relatively little attention to 
analyzing climate change risks and opportunities on the shorter timescales 
more relevant to the private sector, and in analyzing private sector 
adaptation responses. 
From the private financial perspective, thinking about the risks of 
climate change can be framed as whether and to what extent climate change 
will affect the value of assets under consideration.  In other words, if all the 
currently known information about climate change, its implications on the 
business, legal, social and ecological environment, and consequent impacts 
on business performance are incorporated and reflected in the company’s 
valuation; will the result show that the company’s value is affected or not? If 
value is affected by changing climate risks, what are the options to adapt 
optimally to the changing environment and avoid erosion of value, as well 
as to exploit opportunities? 
However intuitive and simple the process may seem – evaluation of 
climate risks and opportunities (including analysis of financial implications), 
and appraisal of adaptation options – a number of hurdles make its 
application challenging. 
One of the first steps in taking this approach is to develop an 
understanding of the climatic changes that may affect an investment directly 
or indirectly over the investment’s lifecycle.  However, climate models are 
typically developed for large geographic areas and only provide limited 
guidance on the effects on the localized areas that are relevant to individual 
investments.16  Even though a number of methods exist through which more 
localized data can be derived from global climate models, the information 
that is needed for downscaling may be incomplete, uncertain, or 
inappropriate, requiring additional work and relevant expertise.17  
Furthermore, the climatic phenomena that may impact an analyzed 
investment may be highly localized and affected by non-climatic influences – 
15. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC MODELS 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 13 (2007) available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/ 
dice_mss_072407_all.pdf; STERN, supra note 9.  Even if the discount rate used for an 
investment is in the low range of historic real returns, 6 percent, the value of 
reducing risk several decades in the future would markedly decline. This occurrence 
may be significantly more noticeable in private sector investments in developing 
countries where discount rates can be significantly higher. 
16. IPCC, supra note 6.
17. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.1, Ch.
3 (2006).  
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for example, flash floods in mountainous areas, driven by deforestation. 
Although none of these issues are insurmountable, the absence of readily 
available localized data may be a major obstacle to delivering robust 
analyses of climate change risks and opportunities, particularly for investors 
who do not have appropriate expertise or means to develop them (as is 
often the case in developing countries).18 
Another important issue that arises when undertaking private sector 
climate change risk assessment is that of time horizons.  Private investments 
generally involve relatively short time periods for which the climate change 
signal is weak.19  Conversely, when considering longer time horizons, the 
question of uncertainty and appropriate discount rates as applied to 
financial risks and adaptation measures becomes very relevant.20  Where the 
uncertainties related to climate impacts are high (and the discount rates 
applied reflect this condition), events placed in a sufficiently remote future – 
even with very significant financial impacts – may seem of little relevance to 
decision making today.21 
Finally, local knowledge and experience influences decision making. 
For example, when the stock market fluctuates, there exists reasonably well 
understood historical data which may be incorporated into analysis of the 
market and the subsequent business implications.  Climate change, 
however, is a changing variable that does not allow historical data relating 
to climate impact on business performance to be an adequate basis for 
understanding future risks and making informed decisions.  Furthermore, 
even when climate forecasts exist, people are often reluctant to act until 
after natural disasters occur.22  The boat owners in Grenada had every reason 
18. This issue is particularly acute for many clients of international
development institutions who are frequently second-tier companies with a greater 
need for noncommercial financing.  See Int’l Finance Corporation [IFC], World Bank 
Group, Creating Opportunity: Annual Report, at 86, (2008). 
19. In the next couple of decades, natural variability in climate will be the dominant 
climatic effect causing risks to business performance, and a small climate change effect 
will compound (add to), or reduce the impacts of natural variability. In the longer term – 
from mid-century onwards – the climate change effect will start to be felt more strongly by 
businesses, though clearly natural variability in climate will remain. 
20. IFC loan terms are typically up to 12 years and frequently less – longer than
is usually the case for private commercial loans.  Id. at 108.  This is one important 
advantage associated with loans from international financial institutions, which 
borrowers frequently perceive to be more complicated and costly than private 
commercial loans. 
21. STERN, supra note 9, at 161-90.
22. “It is generally necessary to use judgmental probabilities in analyses of climate
change because there are limited or no historical observations on which to base 
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to believe they were acting responsibly to minimize risks until Hurricane 
Ivan struck, and many residents of south Florida and other hurricane-prone 
areas keep returning, despite their losses.23 
Despite the increasing attention given to climate change, there is 
currently a lack of incentives to analyze climate risks as a standard part of 
the financial assessment associated with business investments.  This is 
likely to start changing in the future, due to pressure from regulators and the 
financial services community.  Early examples of investor pressure for 
disclosure include the petitions to the SEC from groups of investors 
managing more than US$1.5 trillion, calling for disclosure of “specific known 
trends, events or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material 
effect on a company’s financial condition or operating performance” related 
to climate change.24  More recently, the New York Attorney General’s office 
reached a binding and enforceable agreement with a major national energy 
company to disclose analyses of “financial risks from climate change related 
to present and probable future climate change regulation and legislation; 
climate change-related litigation; and physical impacts of climate change.”25 
Similarly, we expect that future analyses of links between private sector 
adaptation actions and their implications for the wider public environment 
will provide increasing incentives to examine climate risks and undertake 
adaptive measures. 
The role of the insurance sector can also prove important in providing 
incentives for adaptive measures.  For example, there are proven 
construction methods and materials known to reduce fire risk for homes in 
areas subject to risks from wildfires.  However the availability of federal 
assessments of the parameters of concern. We cannot, for example, estimate the 
economic impact of a 3°C rise in global temperature from historical data because nothing 
resembling that kind of global change has occurred in the historical record of human 
societies. There is no single methodology for determining judgmental probabilities. 
Researchers rely on a variety of techniques including personal judgments, betting 
markets, surveys of experts, and comparisons of results from alternative models or 
theories as providing information for the underlying distributions” in William Nordhaus, 
The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental Policy (July 24, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale University). 
23. See RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (Oxford University
Press 2004) for a discussion of the relationship between culture, psychology, and 
economics as factors in the human response (or lack thereof) to disasters. 
24. For a chronology of SEC Climate Risk Disclosure petitions see
www.ceres.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=430&srcid=430; Cf. D.R. Kosnik, Climate 
Change Litigation and Corporate Risk: Navigating in an Uncertain Climate – SEC 
Disclosure Issues, Address at Jones Day Climate Change Conference (Sept. 17, 2008). 
25. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of New York, (Aug. 27,
2008) (on file with author). 
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disaster assistance has reduced the incentives for insurance companies to 
adjust premiums and condition the availability of coverage for homeowners 
adopting these measures.26  There are similar measures known to increase 
wind resistance and damages from hurricanes.27  Such measures are 
examples of “no-regrets” actions that could be further promoted for their 
climate adaptation benefits.  However, as noted by Kunreuther,28 certain 
actions such as subsidies on insurance policies may produce anomalies that 
distort the response of insurance providers.  Although some climate change 
related insurance products have been on the market for some time the 
availability of such products is still relatively low, and primarily in the 
industrialized countries.  Interest in the role of insurance products is 
beginning to expand, however, and there are some emerging products such 
as a form of government policy or weather derivatives for small farmers.29  
New underwriting skills will be needed to evaluate and price climate 
adaptation measures, and existing insurance covers will need to adapt to 
changing risks, since historical loss trends which form the basis of actuaries’ 
models may be unreliable guides for pricing. This difficulty on one side and 
a lack of appropriate products on the other may be particularly pronounced 
in developing countries. 
Approaching adaptation in developing countries has additional 
challenges.  As a starting point, developing countries have a substantial 
adaptation deficit30 and in some cases significant “maladaptation,” e.g., 
subsidies resulting in the inefficient use of water. The discussion of 
26. R. Gorte, “Forest Fire/Wildfire Protection, CRS Report for Congress (CRS
Report RL30755, available at colaradofirecampl.org/congressional _research/forest-fire-
roles-responsibilities.htm. 
27. The Benefits of Modern Wind Resistant Building Codes on Hurricane Claim Frequency
and Severity, 2004 INST. FOR BUS. & HOME SAFETY 2, available at www.ibhs.org/newsroom/ 
downloads/20070810_102941_10167.pdf. 
28. HOWARD KUNREUTHER & MARK PAULY, 1 INSURANCE DECISION-MAKING AND MARKET
BEHAVIOR 110 (2005).  “For some risks such as wind damage from hurricanes, the 
reluctance of insurers to reduce premiums for those adopting mitigation measures is 
due to their being forced by the regulators to charge highly subsidized rates in 
hazard-prone areas. Hence each firm prefers that the policyholder cancel their 
insurance rather than continue with the company. For this reason insurers do not 
provide premium incentives for adopting mitigation measures if they think that a 
lower premium conditional on mitigation will encourage more people to buy 
coverage. This apparent anomaly can therefore be traced to regulation.” 
29. Olivier Mahul, Insuring Against Risks, ENVIRONMENT MATTERS AT THE WORLD 
BANK,  2007, at 30-31 (ANNUAL REPORT), 
30. IAN BURTON, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ADAPTATION DEFICIT in BUILDING THE ADAPTIVE 
CAPACITY, at 25-33 (A. Fenech et al. eds., Meteorological Service of Canada, 2004). 
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adaptation financing is also sometimes confused with discussion of funding 
needs such as disaster relief and proposals for compensation due to the 
absence of climate resilience.  Furthermore, there is limited donor funding 
currently available for developing country adaptation – far less than initial 
studies estimate will be necessary under almost any conceivable 
circumstances – and most of it is destined for vulnerability studies, 
development of “screening tools” to identify projects at risk, and other 
precursors to actual adaptation measures.31  
The IFC is a member of the World Bank Group (WBG) with the goal of 
fostering sustainable economic growth in developing countries by financing 
private sector investment, mobilizing capital in the international financial 
markets, and providing advisory services to businesses and governments.32  
Among its strategic priorities are building long-term partnerships and 
sustainability of its investments.  As such, IFC reviews the environmental 
risks associated with its investments and requires that every investment be 
insured. 
In July 2007, IFC announced that responding to climate change was 
one of its strategic priorities and accordingly identified several elements of a 
climate change strategy, including an assessment of the risks to its 
31. World Bank, DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR
THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 26-29 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/21928837/DC2008-0009(E)ClimateChange.pdf.  Annex 
2, pp. 26-29 summarizes publicly available estimates of adaptation cost and 
investment requirements; the range is from $4 billion per year to $86 billion per year 
by 2016.  In contrast the listed sources of financing are each in the range of tens of 
millions of dollars with the exception of the Adaptation Fund.  The latter is described 
as potentially a total of $300 million to $500 million by 2012 – still much less than 
estimated needs – based on a required contribution of 2 percent of CERs from CDM 
projects; a description of this Fund and resource estimates is available at the 
UNFCCC website, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/ 
adaptation_fund/items/3659.php.  Holdings of CERs in the Fund as of November 21, 
2008, were approximately 4.4 million (the number of CERs in hand is updated 
regularly at the website), worth between $60 million and $70 million based on 
current market values (prices fluctuate considerably based on market demand and 
relative currency values).  The Adaptation Fund has yet to become fully operational, 
although rules are being defined.  Annex 2, Table A2:3, p. 27, also shows the role and 
scope for each of the currently available adaptation funds; less than $100 million is 
identified as available for “adaptation projects” as opposed to studies and capacity 
building.  
32. See generally International Finance Corporation, Annual Report, 2008
(detailing IFC investments and advisory services during FY2008), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/annualreport.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/AR2008_English/$FILE/
AR2008_English.pdf. 
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portfolio.33  In parallel, the World Bank began preparing a strategic 
framework for the entire WBG, which also includes adaptation.34  The public 
sector perspective, however, significantly differs from the private outlook by 
taking a longer term planning approach for countries/regions and sectors. 
Accordingly, the World Bank and other multilateral development banks have 
focused their efforts to date primarily on studies to identify areas of greatest 
vulnerability; strategies to enhance country capacity to prepare for climate 
change; means of “climate proofing” bank lending; and identification of best 
practices as the basis for integrating climate change considerations in 
development.35 
Consequently, IFC decided to pursue several pilot studies as a test to 
develop a first order understanding of what was possible in studies of 
climate change risk in the context of its existing investments. 
IFC Adaptation Pilot Studies 
To begin to develop its understanding of the risks and uncertainties 
posed by climate change to its investment portfolio, IFC has commissioned 
three pilot studies of typical project investments in large, fixed assets.  The 
pilot studies cover a range of sectors and geographies, and investigate how 
climate change affects financial, engineering/technical, environmental, and 
social performance.  The studies are also evaluating the costs and benefits 
of potential adaptation measures that can be used to address the risks 
identified, in order to make the projects more climate resilient.  Finally, the 
studies aim to provide transferable lessons about the potential to make 
adaptation decisions at the project level in developing countries, where 
limited (or uncertain) data and information constrain the robustness of the 
analyses that can be undertaken.  
The pilot studies are being developed using a risk assessment and 
management framework developed specifically for climate adaptation 
33. Id.
34. World Bank, supra note 30.
35. Id. at 41-46; The Africa Development Bank et al, Joint MDB Report to the G8
on the Implementation of the Clean Energy Investment Framework and Their Climate 
Change Agenda Going Forward,  34-39, 48-50, available at http://www.g8summit.go.jp/ 
doc/pdf/0708_07_en.pdf; World Bank, Environment Matters, available at http://www. 
worldbank.org/environmentmatters (highlighting special issue on climate change 
adaptation in the World Bank Group); see generally IAN BURTON, ELIZABETH MALONE, &
SALEEMIL HUQ, ADAPTATION POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: DEVELOPING 
STRATEGIES, POLICIES AND MEASURES, (Bo Lim & Erika Spanger-Siegfried eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2005) (for a United Nations approach). 
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decision making.36  The framework brings together techniques from climate 
science – such as the use of climate change scenarios – with approaches to 
risk-based decision making.  Risk assessment and risk management are 
routinely used by business, so the framework can help with mainstreaming 
climate change risks into business decisions.  An annotated version of the 
framework is below (Figure A.).  
Figure A: The UKCIP risk-based decision-making framework for climate 
change adaptation.37 
This framework has a number of additional advantages.  It emphasizes 
the importance of understanding current vulnerabilities and sensitivities to 
climatic variability, as well as identifying critical climatic thresholds, 
representing the boundaries between tolerable and intolerable levels of risk, 
36. U.K. CLIMATE IMPACTS PROGRAMME TECHNICAL REPORT, CLIMATE ADAPTATION: RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND DECISION-MAKING (Robert Willows & Richenda Connell eds., UK 
Climate Impacts Programme 2003). 
37. Id. at 7 (reproduced with permission).
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as shown in Figure B below. Information and data on current and future 
climate conditions can then be assessed against the thresholds, to evaluate 
the likelihood of their being exceeded.  This helps to focus attention on the 
critical issues for the risk assessment.  
Figure B: The relationship between critical thresholds, vulnerability, 
coping ranges and climate variability/climate change.38 
Some stages within the framework are tiered, because screening, 
evaluation and prioritization of climate risks and adaptation options is 
recommended (Tier 1), before moving on to more detailed risk assessments 
and options appraisals (Tiers 2 and 3).  
For the pilot studies, the framework is being used alongside traditional 
financial appraisal methods.  Financial models for the pilot studies are 
being perturbed based on the outcomes of the engineering, environmental 
and social assessments, to develop scenarios of future project financial 
performance with and without adaptation measures (see Figure C).  One 
challenge faced in these assessments is the limited ability to quantify risks, 
particularly those related to social or environmental changes (such as forced 
relocation of populations), or damage to natural systems (such as loss of a 
species).  In such cases, only qualitative risk assessment may be possible, 
which are in turn difficult to incorporate into financial models.  For this 
38. Id. at 73 (reproduced with permission).
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reason, the term “financial scenarios” is used to reflect some of the limits of 
the analyses. 
Figure C: Schematic showing how climate change could affect financial 
models for major projects.  
Early Lessons Learned from Pilot Studies 
While the pilot studies are still under development, we can still make 
several observations based on our experiences to date.  Some of these 
observations are common to all climate change risk assessments, at any 
scale.  Other observations are more pertinent to risk assessments and 
adaptation decision-making at the level of an individual project.  
First, similarly to many climate change assessments, the analyses are 
contingent on assumptions about greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over 
coming decades, which in turn are dependent on demographic 
development, socio-economic development, and technological change.  All 
of these factors are uncertain, so a range of GHG emissions scenarios are 
explored in the risk assessment.  Major climate modeling centers around the 
globe use the emissions scenarios as input into their climate models, 
termed General Circulation Models (GCMs).  The GCMs provide projections 
of future climate conditions under the different emissions scenarios, giving 
data on temperature, precipitation, wind speed, and other variables.  The 
climate models do not perform equally well in all regions or countries. 
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Improvements to climate model performance are often constrained by the 
paucity of observations of climate in developing countries.  Furthermore, for 
many developing countries, only coarse-scale GCMs are available, typically 
providing climatic data at a spatial resolution of 100km2 to 400km2, a 
resolution which is insufficient to capture local-scale climatic factors that 
can be important at the project level.  For some countries, finer-scale 
regional climate models have been developed, and tools and methods are 
available for “downscaling.” 
Secondly, climate changes are expected to accelerate over time, as 
GHG emissions increase and the climate system gradually responds.  There 
is also the risk of abrupt climate change, if one of a number of possible 
critical thresholds in the climatic system is exceeded.  In the short term, 
however, climate changes may continue to be gradual and difficult to 
distinguish from the effects of natural climate variability. 
Thirdly, there are long cause-effect chains from climate hazard to 
specific risk receptors of interest.  For instance, changing precipitation and 
rising temperatures due to climate change lead to increased glacial melt and 
changed river hydrology.  In turn, the hydrological changes affect the energy 
output from a run-of-river hydropower facility, with consequent impacts on 
the facility’s financial performance.  IFC’s main interest is in understanding 
changes in financial performance and long-term sustainability, but the risk 
assessment is complicated and confounded by uncertainty.  The choice of 
adaptation measures is also uncertain and influenced by many unrelated 
business concerns, such as short term capital requirements and local 
knowledge/capacity.  Some useful adaptation options for decision making 
under conditions of high uncertainty are summarized in Box A. 
1. ‘No regret’: Measures that deliver benefits that exceed their costs,
whatever the extent of climate change:
?Preparing for questions from government, investors, analysts, lenders,
lawyers 
?Funding baseline climate monitoring and regional climate models
?More holistic approaches to water cycle management in water-
constrained locations. 
2. ‘Low regret’: Low cost measures with, potentially large benefits under
climate change:
?Allowing for heavier rainfall when designing new drainage system –
make drainage pipes wider, use Sustainable Drainage Systems. 
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3. ‘Flexible approaches/Adaptive management’: Keeping open / increasing
options that will allow additional climate adaptation in future, when the need
for adaptation and performance of different adaptation measures is less
uncertain:
?Flood management: allow for future increases in defence height by
making foundations fatter, but do not build higher defence 
immediately. 
4. ‘Win-win’: Measures that contribute to climate adaptation and also deliver
other benefits:
?Creation of salt-marsh habitat provides flood protection for coastal
areas and contributes to nature conservation objectives. 
5. Avoid ‘maladaptive’ actions that will make it more difficult to cope with
climate change risks:
?Inappropriate development in a flood risk area.
Box A: Categorization of adaptation options for robust decision-
making under conditions of high uncertainty, with examples39 
Fourthly, it is understandable that private firms may be reluctant to 
publicize findings with respect to their financial risks.  Even participating in 
studies may expose them to pressure for disclosure based on securities 
regulation and accounting rules.  The necessity to share financial models is 
a specific concern.  This creates a disincentive to the necessary sharing of 
results fundamental for learning. 
Finally, private firms are likely to find that for many climate risks, their 
ability to respond is limited even when risks are identified, because the 
relevant authority for key adaptation measures is in the public sector.  For 
example, a private water distribution utility may depend on public water 
authorities for long-term management of the resource. 
Although this paper addresses the issues and risks associated with 
climate change on the business sector, it is necessary to highlight that 
climate change risks may also create business opportunities.  For example, a 
hydropower system operator faced with predicted decline in precipitation 
39. See generally, U.K. CLIMATE IMPACTS PROGRAMME TECHNICAL REPORT, CLIMATE 
ADAPTATION: RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND DECISION-MAKING (Robert Willows & Richenda 
Connell eds., UK Climate Impacts Programme 2003).  
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may find that the value of investing in water storage systems may have high 
rewards if the larger power system will be forced to pay more for power.  
These business opportunities may prove to be an integral part of the 
financial risk analysis of climate change, but as of now are not sufficiently 
well understood to address in this paper. 
Conclusions 
There are some important implications for decision making arising 
from the uncertainties inherent in climate change risk analyses.  It is clear 
that climate change exacerbates many of the risks already faced by project 
investments – be they financial, engineering, environmental or social.  While 
climate change risk assessments at the project level are fraught with 
uncertainty, in the face of strong consensus and evidence from the scientific 
community that man-made climate is underway, it will be increasingly 
advisable to investigate opportunities to make projects more resilient.  This 
approach has already been introduced by a few farsighted entities, such as 
the United Kingdom Environment Agency’s management of future flood risk 
on the River Thames, through the Thames Estuary 2100 project.40 
An appreciation that adaptation issues merit a central role in the 
evolution of policy responses to climate change is still relatively recent.  As 
the Economist magazine recently noted, “For years, greens said 
adaptation . . . was like putting out a fire on the Titanic: desirable, no doubt, 
but the main thing was to change course.”41  For this reason the climate 
change negotiations and most legal analysis of climate change continues to 
focus primarily on climate change mitigation – reducing the buildup of 
growth in GHGs.  There is no longer any doubt that efforts to understand 
and adapt to the consequences of climate change will be increasingly 
important.42  Private entities will bear much of the burden of defining and 
implementing these responses, although public policy will facilitate or 
burden their efforts.  This process has only just begun but can be expected 
to evolve rapidly in response to both necessity and concerted effort in the 
years to come. 
40. Environment-Agency.gov.uk, Thames Estuary 2100 Project, http://www.
environment-agency.gov.uk/te2100/ (last visited October 26, 2008). 
41. Adapt or Die; Climate Change and the Poor, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story _id=12208005. 
42. Gary Guzy, Insurance and Climate Change, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S.
LAW, 541, 541-64 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., American Bar Association 2007) (while the 
book as a whole presents a generally comprehensive treatment of climate change 
issues, the subject of adaptation is a primary topic in Mr. Guzy’s one brief chapter on 
insurance issues). 
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